AUTH-005critical SeverityBroken Authentication & Access Controls
Object-Level Access Control (IDOR / BOLA Prevention)
AI route handlers read an id from the URL params and query db.find(id) without verifying the record belongs to the logged-in user.
1-Click Fix Prompt for Cursor & Claude Code
Review my codebase for "Object-Level Access Control (IDOR / BOLA Prevention)" (AUTH-005). Issue: AI route handlers read an id from the URL params and query db.find(id) without verifying the record belongs to the logged-in user. Remediation required: Always scope database updates and deletions by both record ID and session user ID (e.g. WHERE id = :id AND user_id = :userId). Please: 1. Locate any occurrences of this issue across my repository. 2. Refactor the code to follow production standards without breaking existing functionality. 3. Provide a clear command or step to test and verify the fix.
Why AI Assistants Write This Bug
AI route handlers read an id from the URL params and query db.find(id) without verifying the record belongs to the logged-in user.
AI code generation prioritizes immediate syntax execution over production edge cases. When an assistant hits an undefined variable or strict type error, it frequently takes the path of least resistance rather than implementing standard pre-launch security patterns.
Code Comparison
Common AI Code PatternVulnerable
// Vulnerable AI-generated pattern for: Object-Level Access Control (IDOR / BOLA Prevention)
// Insecure route handler trusting body user ID (IDOR risk)
export async function POST(req: Request) {
const { userId, newEmail } = await req.json();
// BUG: Any user can modify any other user record!
await db.user.update({ where: { id: userId }, data: { email: newEmail } });
return Response.json({ success: true });
}Launch-Ready Fix
// Production-ready fix for: Object-Level Access Control (IDOR / BOLA Prevention)
// Protected route deriving identity from verified session
export async function POST(req: Request) {
const session = await auth();
if (!session?.user?.id) {
return Response.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, { status: 401 });
}
const { newEmail } = await req.json();
// Scoped strictly to authenticated session user ID
await db.user.update({ where: { id: session.user.id }, data: { email: newEmail } });
return Response.json({ success: true });
}Remediation & Verification Checklist
Remediation: Always scope database updates and deletions by both record ID and session user ID (e.g. WHERE id = :id AND user_id = :userId).
- Search your codebase for pattern matching "Object-Level Access Control (IDOR / BOLA Prevention)".
- Apply the recommended remediation: Always scope database updates and deletions by both record ID and session user ID (e.g. WHERE id = :id AND user_id = :userId).
- Run local build and test commands to ensure no regressions.
- Verify in your browser or with curl that the issue is resolved.
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